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University of Pittsburgh Law Review (forthcoming)
Appraising the U.S. Supreme Court’s Philipp Decision
by
Vivian Grosswald Curran*
ABSTRACT
This article assesses the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) after the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Germany v. Philipp. Philipp’s rejection of a
genocide exception for a foreign state’s act of property expropriation comports
with the absence of such an exception in the FSIA’s text. The article also suggests
that the genocide exception as it had been developing was a detrimental
development in FSIA interpretation, and was also harmful to international human
rights law, inasmuch as it distorted the concept of genocide. The Philipp Court’s
renewed focus on the international law of property, rather than of human rights,
should not harm victims of expropriation who have availed themselves of the
genocide exception in past years, because discriminatory takings are a violation of
international property law. Similarly, in Philipp, the Supreme Court framed the
issue as one of domestic takings, concluding that such takings cannot come within
an exception to foreign sovereign immunity, but at the same time the Court did
not reject prior case law which holds that a taking is not domestic in nature if
made by a sovereign against its own vulnerable minorities if it did not treat them
as full citizens at the time of the property expropriation. Thus, the same sorts of
victims who were recovering under the recent FSIA genocide exception (and had
been recovering before the FSIA genocide exception was created) should be able
to continue to have their cases heard under the FSIA. This article also considers
recent international law developments which maintain that international law is
concerned with how states treat their own citizens, suggesting that the FSIA’s
domestic versus alien expropriation test, not textually based in the statute, may
be ripe for reconsideration, with a view to eliminating the distinction. While such
an approach for FSIA’s property expropriation section would not contradict the

1

statute’s text, it would contravene precedential authority, and would not be
endorsed under Philipp’s reasoning.
Key words: Germany v. Philipp, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
property expropriation; genocide exception; domestic takings;
international law.

I.

Introduction

With its recent decision in Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp,1 the U.S.
Supreme Court put an end to a case law evolution that had been developing over
the past several years in some federal courts of appeal, including the D.C. Court of
Appeals.2 The federal appellate courts in question had adopted an exception to
foreign sovereign immunity for property expropriations that occurred in the
context of genocide.3 A genocide exception is not enumerated in the text of
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)’s list of exceptions to immunity from
jurisdiction, however.
The problems with this evolution in the law of the FSIA were both from the
standpoint of the FSIA and from that of the law of genocide. The FSIA is a

*Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
1
141 S. Ct. 703, 592 U.S. – (2020).
2
Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012); Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847
(7th Cir. 2016); Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2013; Mezerhane v. República
Bolivariana Venezuela, 785 F.3d 545 (11th Cir. 2015) (distinguiushing its case on Seventh Circuit criteria); Camparelli
v. República Bolivariana Venezuela, 891 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Abelesz exhaustion requirements with
approval).
3
See id.
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comprehensive statute, to be interpreted based on its text, as Congress stated
when enacting it,4 and as the Supreme Court has expressly held on more than one
occasion: “The key word … is comprehensive;”5 and “any sort of immunity defense
made by a foreign sovereign in an American court must stand on the Act’s text. Or
it must fall.”6
The courts that interpreted FSIA’s property expropriation exception so as to
include a genocide exception were not just creating a new meaning in the
property expropriation text of the FSIA; they also were creating case law
precedent that redefined and weakened the concept of genocide at a time when
the politicization of the term has been signaled as becoming increasingly
problematic.7 Moreover, victims of genocide previously had been able to obtain
satisfaction under a separate evolution of FSIA case law that involved an
interpretation of the statute directly involving the expropriation of property by
foreign sovereigns of non-nationals,8 so plaintiffs did not need the genocide
exception from a practical perspective. Philipp on the whole represents a salutary
redirection of the law, although it fails to adopt the position international law
4

“Claims of foreign states should henceforth be decided by courts … in conformity with the principles set forth
[herein].” 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
5
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, 573 U.S. 134, 1414 (2014) (emphasis in original); referring to Austria v.
Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004) and Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983).
6
Id.
7
See infra, Section III.
8
See id.
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increasingly has been espousing: namely, that international law today is
concerned with how other states treat their own nationals.9 The Supreme Court’s
rejection of that interpretation of the FSIA property expropriation exception is
consistent with past case law and, as it explained, much international law and U.S.
legal tradition.10
II.

The FSIA’s Property Expropriation Exception
A. Jus Cogens in an Early Case and Reprised in Philipp

The statute’s property expropriation, Section 1605 (a) (3), reads in relevant
part as follows: “(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of
courts of the United States or of the States in any case… (3) in which rights in
property taken in violation of international law are in issue….”11 The challenge for
genocide victims has been that the FSIA does not allow for non-commercial tort
recovery for such torts if they are committed outside of the United States.12
Plaintiffs therefore have sued under Section 1605 (a) (3) for the property that was
stolen from them as part of the genocidal projects.

9

See infra, Conclusion.
See Philipp, 141 S. Ct. at 709-711; Restatement (Fourth) § 441.
11
28 U.S.C. §1605 (2016).
12
See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (5) (“money damages [may be] sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission
of that foreign state …”).
10
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Early cases were dismissed, however. In Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany,13 a man who had at all relevant times continuously been a U.S. citizen
was unable to maintain an action against Germany for property expropriation
connected with deporting him during the Second World War from Slovakia to Nazi
concentration camps, where he underwent inhumane physical abuse and during
which time all of his family perished under agonizing circumstances. The Second
Circuit’s majority, in a reversal of the lower court, noted in particular that the
commission of a jus cogens violation “does not confer jurisdiction under the
FSIA.”14 The court reasoned that the plaintiff had failed to establish any of Section
1605’s exceptions to immunity, and rejected plaintiff’s argument that
fundamental human rights violations could be equated with an implicit waiver of
immunity.15
The Princz case was controversial because the plaintiff had always been a
U.S. citizen, even at the time of the alleged acts, and because the decision left him
entirely without a remedy precisely because, as a U.S. citizen, he was not eligible
for post-war German restitution which he otherwise would have been able to
obtain as a European Nazi victim.16 The waiver of immunity exception has been

13

26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1174.
15
Id.
16
See id. at 1176-85.
14
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less frequently invoked ever since, and, as explained by the Restatement (Fourth)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (« Restatement Fourth »), in
keeping with the rationale of Princz, it is problematic for plaintiffs because the
legal concept of waiver requires a voluntary act on the part of the defendant.17
With Philipp, the Supreme Court echoed Princz’s understanding of jus
cogens as not being a basis for an independent Section 1605 basis for FSIA
jurisdiction. The Philipp case involved valuable art that had belonged to German
Jewish owners during the Nazi period until Hitler’s Reich Marshal Goering decided
he wanted to own it personally. The plaintiffs alleged in the case that the owners
then were forced to sell at a coerced price after Goering’s representatives
threatened them. In Philipp, the Supreme Court reasoned that that the plaintiffs
were misguided in arguing that section 1605’s phrase “in violation of international
law” includes genocide, the basis of plaintiffs’ Section 1605 exception claim,18
because, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the international law referenced in
the FSIA section at issue in cases of property expropriation is the international law
of property (presumably the customary international law of property), not an

17
18

Section 453, Reporters’ note 1.
For how the taking of property came to be a basis for claiming genocide, see infra, Section III.
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expanded law of international customary law that encompasses all of
international human rights.19
Section B below starts with a case in which the foreign sovereign was
deemed to have waived its immunity in the context of jus cogens violations,
unlike in Princz, yet it nevertheless resulted in a dismissal of most of the case
when the court applied what is known as the domestic takings exception to bar
most of plaintiffs’ claims.20
B. Domestic Takings and the Relevant Nationality Test
In Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, the U.S. district court
deemed Argentina to have waived its sovereign immunity where it had asked the
U.S. courts to assist it in criminally prosecuting the Sidermans as part of
Argentina’s discriminatory persecution of the family based on their Jewish
heritage.21 That, however, was not the end of the story. Under international law
in general, states traditionally do not interfere with what other sovereigns do to
their own nationals, so the courts of the United States have adopted a domestic
takings exception that reinstates immunity where a sovereign’s property

19

Philipp, 141 S. Ct. 703, at 715.
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992).
21
Id.
20
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expropriation is committed against its own national.22 This principle of noninterference derives from international comity,23 and has been noted with
approval in The Restatement (Fourth).24 In Siderman, the Ninth Circuit held that
only the family’s daughter’s claims could survive because she was a U.S. citizen,
such that Argentina in her case had dispossessed a non-Argentinian in violation of
Section 1605. The court dismissed the parents’ claims because, being Argentinian,
they fell within the domestic takings exception.
1. Germany
In the years since Siderman,25and perhaps particularly since Princz,
however, the courts have developed a test for nationality under the FSIA property
expropriation exception that Philipp endorsed and that had become established
in FSIA case law well before plaintiffs argued, and in some circuits obtained, the
now-overturned genocide exception. That test, which I have called the
« substantive citizenship rights »26 standard, to contrast with nominal or formal

22

See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Evolving Genocide Exception, 23 UCLA
J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF.46, 60-63 (2019).
23
See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (2015) (offering a
comprehensive analysis of the area).
24
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) §405.
25
It is not clear that the Spiderman case would have come out differently under the substantive citizenship test. It
is true that Jews were a particular target of persecution at the time known as Argentina’s « dirty war, » but given
how viciously others were persecuted at the time for their political views, the Siderman case may not be in
contrast to the substantive citizenship rights test. For an excellent portrayal of the dirty war by a Jewish leftist
newspaper publisher, see JACOBO TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER (1981).
26
See Curran, 23 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 46, at 60.
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citizenship, began when the Ninth Circuit decided in Cassirer v. Kingdom of
Spain27 that German Jews living in Nazi Germany in 1939, although not having
citizenship in any other country, were exempt from being deemed German for
purpose of the FSIA’s domestic takings exception. Cassirer concerned the
plaintiff’s grandmother, a German Jew who had had to undergo a forced sale of
her property at a ludicrously low amount in order to be permitted to leave Nazi
Germany. The Ninth Circuit rejected Germany’s argument that this constituted
a « domestic taking » and that, therefore, it was immune from jurisdiction under
the FSIA. Rather, the court said that the plaintiff’s grandmother, although
nominally German, had been deprived by the defendant’s predecessor state of
the fundamental rights that characterize citizenship : « a citizen is one who has
the right to exercise all the political and civil privileges extended by his
government … Citizenship conveys the idea of membership in a nation… ».28
2. Hungary
In De Csepel v. Republic of Hungary,29 the lower court found, and the
appellate court approved, that Jews in Hungary dispossessed of property during

27

616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id., at1023. (emphasis added). The Nazi government’s Nuremberg laws of 1935 had relegated Jews to secondclass citizenship, depriving them of such rights, and Nazi Germany made clear that it did not consider Jews to be
part of the German nation in terms of Volk, an ethnic perspective of nationhood, based on what it called blood and
race (“Blut und Rasse”). See Nuremberg Laws, in 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA at 1282.
29
808 F.Supp.2d 113, 130 (D.D.C. 2011), affid in part, rev’d in part, 714 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
28
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the Second World War also did not fall within the domestic takings exception. The
district court evoked the plaintiff’s evidence that
as of 1944, Hungarian Jews could not acquire citizenship by means of
naturalization, marriage, or legalization; vote or be elected to public office; be
employed as civil servants, state employees, or schoolteachers; enter into
enforceable contracts; participate in various industries and professions;
participate in paramilitary youth training or serve in the armed forces; own
property; or acquire title to land or other immovable property. Moreover, all
Hungarian Jews over the age of six were required to wear distinctive signs
identifying themselves as Jewish, and were ultimately subject to complete
forfeiture of all assets, forced labor inside and outside Hungary, and ultimately
genocide.30

Perhaps most notably, where Hungary objected that plaintiff herself had
maintained that she was a Hungarian citizen, the court emphasized that whether
or not she « still considered herself to be a Hungarian citizen in 1944, it is clear
that … the government of Hungary thought otherwise and had de facto stripped
her … and all Hungarian Jews of their citizenship rights. » 31
Both Germany and Hungary had passed antisemitic statutes,32 so the
court’s conclusion could have rested on a de jure basis, but it did not. It is to be

30

Id. at 129 (internal references omitted).
Id. at 130.
32
Hungary had a concept of the Hungarian nation as being based on Magyar ethnic derivation, just as Nazi
Germany did on its version of its Volk,see supra note [28]. For Hungary and the Magyar nationhood concept, see
SUSAN FALUDI, IN THE DARKROOM 72 et seq. (2016). This understanding of the Hungarian people was enacted into law
in the Hungarian Citizenship Law of 1879, Law L, 1879, which remained in effect throughout the Second World
War. On Hungary’s antisemitic legislation, see also Anti-Jewish Legislation, in MOSHE Y. HERCZL, CHRISTIANITY AND THE
HOLOCAUST AGAINST HUNGARIAN JEWRY 81-169 ( trans. Joel Lerner, NYU Press, 1993), available on J-STOR, at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctt9qg6vj.5.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A4bc3263c5966ccf34de82218b847242d
31
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emphasized that the substantive citizenship test is a de facto test, as the court
explicitly stated in de Csepel.33 The de jure aspect of antisemitic legislation is
potent and no doubt conclusive ; thus, sufficient evidence for establishing the
stripping of the essential rights of full citizenship, but the courts’ analysis in both
Cassirer and De Csepel make clear that de jure deprivation of rights is not
necessary to disqualify a taking from being deemed domestic where evidence
exists that the defendant state stripped plaintiff of the full rights of citizenship de
facto.
3. Philipp’s Endorsement of the Substantive Citizenship Test
The Supreme Court held as follows in Philipp: «[T]he phrase ‘rights in
property taken in violation of international law,’ as used in the FSIA's
expropriation exception, refers to violations of the international law of
expropriation and thereby incorporates the domestic takings rule.”34 In the last
sentence of the decision, it also acknowledged that plaintiffs do not fall within the
domestic takings ban if they can meet the substantive citizenship requirement:
“Nor do we consider an alternative argument noted by the heirs: that the sale of

(last visited May 3, 2021). It is argued that this conception is being perpetuated by the contemporary government.
See Peter S. Verovsek, Caught between 1945 and 1989: collective memory and the rise of illiberal democracy in
postcommunist Europe, 28 J. EUR. PUB. POLICY 840, 848 (2020).
33
De Csepel, 808 F.Supp. 2d at 130.
34
141 S. Ct., at 715.
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the Welfenschatz is not subject to the domestic takings rule because the
consortium members were not German nationals at the time of the transaction.
The Court of Appeals should direct the District Court to consider this argument,
including whether it was adequately preserved below.”35
The problem for the Philipp plaintiffs was that, in the words of the Supreme
Court, they had not based their argument on Germany’s failure to come within
the domestic takings exception, but, rather, that “[t]he heirs [had] responded that
the exception did apply because Germany's purchase of the Welfenschatz was an
act of genocide and the taking therefore violated the international law of
genocide;”36 and “[t]he heirs contend that their claims fall within the exception
for “property taken in violation of international law,” § 1605(a)(3), because the
coerced sale of the Welfenschatz, their property, constituted an act of genocide,
and genocide is a violation of international human rights law.”37 Plaintiffs’
argument to the Supreme Court summarized the D.C. Circuit’s holding, along with
the Seventh Circuit’s, that the very taking of property, no matter how minimal,
could be equated with genocide, and that, in direct contradiction to the holding in

35

Id. at 715-716 (internal citations omitted). At oral argument, justices repeatedly asked the plaintiffs’
attorneys who argued the genocide exception if their clients really should be considered to have been
nationals of the defendant states at the time of the takings.
36
37

Id. at 709.
Id.
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Princz, the FSIA denies sovereign immunity for genocide. The next section
explains how such an unlikely development emerged.
III.

Genocide and the FSIA
A. The FSIA Genocide Cases

The genocide exception to the FSIA, entirely court created, displaced the
domestic takings test where plaintiffs argued that property expropriation
occurred in the context of genocide. In Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 38 later
reheard as Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt.,39 the Seventh Circuit held that the
domestic takings standard was inapplicable where property expropriation was “an
integral part[] of [an] overall genocidal plan.…”40 In Abelesz - Fischer, the plaintiffs
were Hungarian Jews whose last belongings were stolen at the train station prior
to deportation to concentration camps; thus, the smallest last remaining
possession of an already impoverished person would qualify as genocide. In that
case, the court did make clear that the taking needed to be an integral part of the
overall genocide, such that the property expropriation that displaced the
domestic takings exception test was not to be isolated from the plan of
genocide.41

38

692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012).
777 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2016)
40
Abelesz, 692 F.3d at 676.
41
See id.
39
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Subsequently, relying on Abelesz, a California district court specified that
even where a plaintiff was a full citizen of the defendant state, a taking in the
context of genocide would be deemed to warrant FSIA jurisdiction because of the
inapplicability of the domestic takings exception.42 That case involved property
expropriation of ethnic Armenians by Turkey during the Armenian genocide,
when, the court held, the Armenians were full citizens of Turkey, however
implausible it may be that the de facto Cassirer and De Csepel substantive
citizenship test can support the conclusion that people targeted for expropriation
and death because of belonging to a minority population could have been fullfledged citizens of the expropriating defendant sovereign state.43
The D.C. Circuit in Philipp echoed Abelesz-Fischer in dispensing with the
domestic takings exception where “the takings of property … bear a sufficient
connection to genocide that they amount to takings ‘in violation of international
law.’”44 But the court then proceeded to exceed even the holding of the Seventh
Circuit by stating that, “[i]n such situations, the expropriations themselves
constitute genocide.”45

42

Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. supp. 3d 1084, 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
See supra Section II, B
44
Philipp, 248 F.Supp. 3d at 70 (quoting Simon, 812 F.3d at 142).
45
Id.
43
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The idea that expropriations in and of themselves are genocide was
expressed very clearly by the appellate court in Simon v. Republic of Hungary,46
the companion case to Philipp in the Supreme Court.47 The facts of Simon were
virtually identical to those of Abelesz, also involving the expropriation of the last
possessions of Hungarian Jews as they were being deported on trains to
concentration camps. The court stated that the act of property dispossession,
without regard to value, or anything else, was itself genocide: “we see the
expropriations as themselves genocide.”48

B. The Law of Genocide
Raphael Lemkin, the author of Axis Rule in Occupied Europe,49 is the man
who coined the term “genocide” after having lost almost all of his family to the
Nazi genocide of Jews. He had been an occasional law professor at Duke and
Columbia Law Schools after his emigration to the United States, but spent almost
all of his time and energy trying to persuade the United Nations to pass a
genocide convention. Michael Ignatieff, whose father was a Canadian diplomat at

46

Simon, 812 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 592 U.S. – (2021) (per curiam).
48
Simon, 812 F.3d. at 142.
49
RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE. LAWS OF OCCUPATION. ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS
(Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 2d ed., 2008).
47
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the U.N. at the time, told his son that Lemkin relentlessly pestered anyone he
came across at the U.N. until finally he succeeded.50 In Philippe Sands’ book, East
Street West Street: On the Origins of “Genocide” and “Crimes against
Humanity,”51 about Lemkin and Lauterpacht, the two giants of twentieth century
international human rights law who influenced the Nuremberg trials, Lemkin
comes across in much the same way. In 1948, Lemkin’s work paid off. The U.N.
passed The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. It defines genocide as follows: As part of “an intent to destroy … a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group…. (a) killing members of the group; …
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction…” and similar acts calculated to annihilate the group.
The history of genocide has been a long and sordid one. Its latest twist has
been its politicization and the inevitable trivialization of the concept that
politicization entails. According to Ignatieff, the term “ ‘genocide’ is now so
banalized and misused that there is a serious risk that commemoration of his
work will become an act of forgetting, obliterating what was so singular about his

50

See Michael Ignatieff, The Unsung Hero Who Coined the Term “Genocide”, New Republic, Sept. 21, 2013,
available at https://newrepublic.com/article/114424/raphael-lemkin-unsung-hero-who-coined-genocide (last
visited April 30, 2021); PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST STREET, WEST STREET: ON THE ORIGINS OF “GENOCIDE” AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY” (2016).
51
(2016).
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achievement,”52 and “Lemkin would have been astonished and indignant at the
afterlife of his word – how victim groups of all kinds have pressed it into service to
validate their victimization, and how powerful states have eschewed the word
lest it entrain an obligation to act.”53 In East Street West Street, Philippe Sands,
writing of his own reflections as an international human rights lawyer, echoes this
sobering perspective.54 They are not alone in decrying international human rights’
politicization.55
When a court says that the taking of any property, however minimal, is
itself genocide, the court, however well-intentioned the judge might be, and I do
not doubt for a moment that all of the FSIA judges in the district and appellate
courts of the Seventh and D.C. circuits and the California and other relevant
district courts were well-meaning, such a judge is not performing a service to the
victims of the Nazi genocide represented by the plaintiffs before them, or, in one
California case, of the Armenian genocide. Rather, it is a disservice to the memory
of those terrible genocides. And it was unnecessary under pre-existing domestic
takings law. Moreover, as things now stand, plaintiffs in Philipp may lose the

52

Michael Ignatieff, Lemkin’s Word, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 26, 2001, available at
https://newrepublic.com/article/62613/lemkins-word (last visited May 1, 2021).
53
Ignatieff, supra note [49].
54
SANDS, supra note [50], at 36.
55
See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EJIL 113 (2005);
GÜNTER FRANKENBERG, COMPARATIVE LAW AS CRITIQUE 172-175 (2016).
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compensation they merit if the lower court on remand finds that they failed to
avail themselves of that argument.56
The recent U.S. Supreme Court Philipp decision was unanimous. It has
corrected the law of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by eliminating a
genocide exception that the FSIA does not have and does not warrant under the
text and interpretive caselaw of the statute, and that demeans the meaning of
genocide.
When the Court emphasized that it was shutting the door on general
international human rights claims and restricting Section 1605 to violations of
international law in the context of property law, it was not precluding the sort of
property expropriation that typifies the claims of genocide victims. The FSIA’s
legislative history characterizes Section 1605 property expropriation “in violation
of international law” as follows:
The term ‘taken in violation of international law’ would include the
nationalization or expropriation of property without payment of the prompt
adequate and effective compensation required by international law. It would also
include takings which are arbitrary or discriminatory in nature. 57

56

See Philipp,
H.R. Rep. 94-1487, at 6616 (Sept. 9, 1976). The House Report contemplates the possible application of the Act of
State doctrine: “Since, however, this section deals solely with issues of immunity, it in no way affects existing law
on the extent to which, if at all, the ‘act of state‘ doctrine may be applicable.”
57
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The Restatement (Fourth) § 455 similarly highlights the following characteristics
which reflect customary international law on property expropriations: “the taking
was not for a public purpose, was discriminatory, or not accompanied by prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation.”58
After Philipp, the international law of illegal property takings does not
include genocide. It does, however, include property expropriation which targets
minority populations in a discriminatory manner and which does not involve
prompt and adequate financial compensation.
A lingering critique of the Supreme Court decision concerns the domestic
takings exception, and whether it would be warranted to move beyond that wellestablished doctrine to embrace current trends in international law. That is the
subject of the following Section.
IV.

Modern International Law’s Evolution Beyond Citizenship Inquiries
for Discriminatory Takings
A. The Philipp Court’s Affirmation of the Domestic Takings Rule

The domestic takings exception is a well-settled doctrine, as the Supreme
Court took pains to note in Philipp, 59 but like the genocide exception, it does not

58

RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) §455, comment c. See also Reporters’ Note 4 (analyzing caselaw); and RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF UNITED STATES LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 712, both more detailed and specifying that it is a summary of

customary international law.
59
Philipp, 141 S. Ct. at 710; 714.
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appear in the text of the FSIA. The Court in recent years has shown a tendency
towards unanimous decisions where some justices’ concerns about maintaining
harmonious relations with other countries meet other concerns of different
justices, such as stemming the tide of litigation.60 Philipp explains the Court’s
objective of furthering U.S. policy to refrain from “producing friction in our
relations with [other] nations and leading some [of them] to reciprocate by
granting their courts permission to embroil the United States in expensive and
difficult litigation.”61
The Court then cited the pre-FSIA letter of Secretary of State Hull to the
effect that Mexico was free to mistreat its own citizens as far as the United States
was concerned, but not U.S. citizens. The Court presented it as part of the origins
of the domestic takings position in the U.S.:
The domestic takings rule has deep roots not only in international law but also in
United States foreign policy. Secretary of State Cordell Hull most famously
expressed the principle in a 1938 letter to the Mexican Ambassador following that
country's nationalization of American oil fields. The Secretary conceded “the right
of a foreign government to treat its own nationals in this fashion if it so desires.
This is a matter of domestic concern.” …The United States, however, could not
“accept the idea” that “these plans can be carried forward at the expense of our
citizens.”62
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It also cited to Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino63 as an indication of U.S.
Congressional intent to distinguish between a foreign sovereign’s taking of its
own citizens’ property and others’, inasmuch as the reaction to the case’s holding
that the Court would not interfere with Cuba’s nationalization of U.S. citizens’
property in Cuba was met by subsequent legislation to require courts to grant
such compensation for U.S. citizens. Moreover, in the context of foreign states’
confiscation of their own citizens’ property, the Philipp Court said that the
principle that domestic takings were not a matter of international law concern
was “beyond debate,” noting that numerous states which nationalized formerly
private property as they adopted socialism vociferously argued for their sovereign
right, not just to do so, but also to nationalize foreigners’ property.64 The Court
did not note, however, that this stance largely has disappeared as developing
states started to want to attract foreign investment to increase their prosperity.65
The takings distinction between a foreign sovereign’s expropriation of its
own nationals’ property and its expropriation of the property of aliens also
derives from an international law tenet that is becoming increasingly obsolete:
that international law does not concern itself with how a state treats its own
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citizens. The Philipp Court anticipated this argument by stating that the “domestic
takings rule endured even as a growing body of human rights law made states’
treatment of individual human beings a matter of international concern.”66 As
international law norms continue to evolve, the issue is if the rule also should
evolve and the FSIA’s §1605 (a) (3)’s property expropriation exception should
deny immunity to a sovereign for any taking in violation of the customary
international law of property, whether its own nationals’ property or the property
of aliens.
B. Current International Law Norms
As the Court acknowledged in Philipp, modern international law came to
recognize the individual as a subject where previously international law had been
a law of states without individuals having a direct role.67 This development,
although with pre-World War II antecedents, predominantly was the
consequence the Second World War’s atrocities.68 The recognition that
international law could and should no longer count on states to protect their own
vulnerable minority populations, much less espouse their legal claims in
66
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international tribunals, has led to a reassessment of entrenched distinctions
between nationals and aliens in numerous international law contexts.
One context is universal jurisdiction, “the authority of the State to punish
certain crimes wherever and by whom committed,”69 regardless of nationality.
While such universally recognized crimes tend to be the subject of jurisdictionconferring treaties, they need not be, since by virtue of being universally
recognized as violations of fundamental human rights, they are erga omnes.70 The
Philipp Court has distanced Section 1605 (a) (3) from this discussion by restricting
it to property law. One need not depend on the law of crimes against humanity,
however, to conclude that the FSIA’s property expropriation section should apply
without regard to citizenship distinctions.
Modern international law has followed the path begun in international
human rights since the Second World War by progressively erasing citizenship
distinctions in international law. In international corporate law, it had long been
held that a state could not espouse the claims of its citizens who held shares in a
company that allegedly was harmed by another state where the company had a
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citizenship other than that of the shareholders.71 In commenting on Diallo,72 a
more recent case in which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) evoked the
above Barcelona Traction principle, Brownlie commented as follows: “[T]he law
has moved on. It is no longer the case that states do not bear international
responsibility for injuries caused to their own nationals.”73 The injury at issue was
precisely the sort of property expropriation that arises in FSIA Section 1605 (a) (3)
cases: it was an allegedly discriminatory taking of the individual’s property
involving harm to his corporation that had been incorporated under the laws of
the defendant state, the Democratic Republic of Congo.74
As Brownlie tells us, international law has moved on, and that specifically
includes the law of property expropriation.75 Had Siderman been decided under
Brownlie’s criteria, the case would have proceeded on all claims despite the
Siderman parents’ having been Argentinian. Similarly, the plaintiffs in Philipp
would be able to have their case heard under these criteria. Restricting the FSIA
Section 1605 property expropriation exception to takings in violation solely of the
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international law of property does not mean that Section 1605 need be restricted
to takings of alien property under current international law.
In Philipp, the Court referred to a “consistent practice of interpreting the
FSIA ‘in keeping with international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment’”76 in
the context of the FSIA’s requirement that sovereign immunity could be lost only
for the expropriation of the property of aliens, or those deemed aliens under the
appropriate application of the domestic takings exception. It cited to only one
case for this appraisal, Permanent Mission of India to United Nations,77 but that
case involved diplomatic protection issues under the FSIA, and concerned the
ability of New York City to tax certain properties rented by lower level employees
of India’s Mission. The Court ruled against sovereign immunity in that case. These
issues are far removed from the takings exception of Section 1605 (a) (3) involved
in Philipp and Simon. Moreover, in Permanent Mission, the Court looked to the
relevant international law at the time of the FSIA’s enactment without stating
that it needed to do so. FSIA case law does not appear to provide a consistent
practice in this regard. Some courts have, on the contrary, explained what they
thought to be international law at the time they were deciding Section 1605 FSIA
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cases, not at the time of the FSIA’s enactment. An example is De Sanchez v. Banco
Cent. de Nicaragua78 in which the court explored recent international law
developments in deciding its FSIA case. The Philipp Court’s declaration of a
consistent practice to the contrary is likely to weigh heavily on the future of this
issue, however.
V.

Conclusion

With Philipp, the Supreme Court has rectified the recent interpretive
mishap of courts which imputed a genocide exception to the FSIA where none
existed, and where its inclusion endangered the meaning of the concept of
genocide. At the same time, the Court maintained the ability of minority victims
of genocidal undertakings to recover for property expropriations where they were
not accorded the rights of citizenship by the expropriating state.
The Court also rejected the possibility of interpreting the international law
provision of the FSIA in terms of contemporary international law standards.
Several factors militate against the probability that U.S. courts will adopt
Brownlie’s approach of making states responsible for how they treat their own
citizens. The first is Philipp’s having asserted that there is a practice of
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interpreting international law as of the time of the FSIA’s enactment. The second
is the Court’s general reluctance in recent years to violate the presumption
against extraterritoriality.79 A third factor, related to the second, is the Court’s
general deference to the Act of State doctrine. The Court also correctly noted
that, as it is, the United States stands as the only country in the world to have a
provision like Section 1605 allowing for the abrogation of foreign sovereign
immunity due to a foreign sovereign’s public acts of property expropriations.80
None of these factors is part of the text of the FSIA, however. Unlikely as it
may seem in Philipp’s aftermath, their sway may ebb if, as time goes by, modern
international law norms become more persuasive.
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